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VREMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN MIKE MANSFIELD 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: REFLECTIONS 
Our country confronts many problems and issues today. 
Energy, the coal strike, the Panama Canal Treaties, OPEC 
and our dependence on it, the Horn in Africa, the Middle East, 
the declining value of the dollar -- to mention only some and 
they are all on the desks of the President and Congress. All 
of them are serious, all deserve discussion and, if you so 
desire, I will be glad to try and answer some of your questions 
on these matters at the conclusions of my remarks. 
As to Japan when I left Washington ten months ago my 
former colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
assured me I would be welcome to return at anytime to testify, 
and that they would try not to be too hard on me. I told them 
I intended to wait until I knew all the answers. After ten 
months on the job in Tokyo I certainly don't know all the 
answers -- although I think I have a better understanding of 
the nature of the questions. But I decided, as long as I was 
called back to Washington to meet with President Carter on the 
upcoming visit of Prime Minister Fukuda)with Vice President 
Mondale on his trip to S.E. Asia next month, and with- Ambassador 
Robert Strauss on US-Japan trade matters -- I decided to come home 
to Montana as well. I hope you will be as kind as my Senate 
friends promised to be. 
The large and growing domestic dimension of our relations 
with Japan means that more and more Americans have a stake, 
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and take an active interest, in our policy toward that 
country. I wanted to listen to some of those people 
in the Congress, in business, in the labor movement, and 
in the Administration -- and to talk to them about the way 
I see the US-Japan relationship. 
I have never subscribed to the definition of an Ambassador 
as an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country. In my 
ten months on the job I have tried to report accurately what 
I have seen, and to give the Japanese Government -- and 
Washington -- straight talk. I promise to offer the same 
to you. I have also tried to avoid one of the perils of 
diplomacy -- what they tell me is called "localitis" --
becoming so taken with the country to which one is accredited 
that judgment suffers and recommendations are warped. In 
Japan it is especially hard to avoid that pitfall. That 
country, like some others in Asia, exerts a powerful influence 
on those who live there. 
This has not been an easy year in our relations with 
Japan, and undoubtedly we are not out of the woods yet. But 
we have come far enough to take stock to tally our successes, 
to acknowledge mistakes, and perhaps to draw some conclusions 
which might serve as useful benchmarks for the future. 
~---------
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Before I get into what I see as the pluses and minuses 
of the past year in us~Japan relations, I want to talk briefly 
about East Asia as a whole. My portfolio is Japan, but you 
can't talk about Japan -- or any part of Asia-- without 
reference to the entire region. Most of the crucial issues 
in Japanese foreign policy are Asian issues, and those issues 
form the prism through which Japan views its relationship 
with the United States. 1977 was an especially intriguing 
year in what for me has always been the most intriguing 
area of the world. 
In the People's Republic of China we have seen over the 
past year an increasing turn toward pragmatism, its leadership 
searching for ways to modernize its economy while paying 
relatively less heed to ideological purity. As modernization 
progresses, the task of governing effectively so vast a segment 
of humanity may well grow more rather than less difficult. In 
pursuing modernization, and a climate of security in which 
modernization can succeed, China is likely to turn outward 
toward Japan, the United States and Europe for technology 
and trade and, to a degree, for tacit political support. 
In my judgment, it clearly behooves us -- Japan, the United 
States and Europe -- to be judiciously responsive. For we all 
have a profound interest in a stable, peaceful China, engaged 
productively in the international system. 
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The USSR of course is also a participant in the affairs 
of East Asia. While the non-communi~t nations of the region 
see it as a somewhat unnatural phenom~non, a Soviet presence~ 
military and political, is increasingly a fact of life. 
Our own attitude toward that presence has been realistic 
we are concerned by Soviet activities and keep a careful 
watching brief, but we are not alarmed. East Asian nations 
themselves -- the PRC of course included are sufficiently 
wary of Soviet intentions that an effective limit is placed on 
the growth of Moscow's influence and disruptive potential in 
the region. But at the same time we have the vital responsi-
bili~y to maintain a strong and credible military force in 
East Asia -- one fully capable of sustaining the strategic 
equilibrium which has existed there in recent years, and with-
out which there could be great danger for the region and for 
the United States. 
The major testing ground of that equilibrium, now as 
always over the past 30 years, is Korea. The Korean peninsula 
remains the one area in East Asia -- and arguably in the world 
-- in which the interests of four major powers are so intimately 
juxtaposed and in which military conflict could prove so 
dangerous. Japan is of course uniquely sensitive to the 
situation in Korea and our policy toward it. 
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In Southeast Asia, the member states of ASEAN have made 
continued, impressive progress in economic development and 
regional cohesion. At the same time, I believe some Southeast 
Asians have been disturbed by what they perceive to be 
lessened US involvement in that region. They and Japan are 
establishing a relationship that promises great benefits to 
both sides -- but which both hope will be complemented by a 
US-ASEAN relationship of equal substance. 
Indochina is preoccupied with internal problems and 
harsh intraregional rivalries. Its immediate future is 
problematic-- clearly the ·priority of its governments logi-
cally should be upon economic development and resolution of 
its currently violent internal conflict. If logic prevails, 
as I hope it will, the prospect for a continued peaceful and 
eventually cooperative relationship between Indochina and the 
rest of Southeast Asia would seem good. If that does occur, 
Japan's carefully evenhanded diplomacy toward Indochina will 
have contributed significantly to the outcome. 
I would like to add one more observation about an aspect 
or East Asia especially pertinent in this era of declining 
energy resources. It is my personal view -- and one, I should 
acknowledge, w~ich is not shared by some of our government 
experts in this field. that the world's next, and perhaps 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 32, Box 1, Folder 15, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
6 
last, great oil find will be in East Asian ·waters. The 
results of exploration have been encouraging~ There are 
indications of oil off the northwest coast of Sakhalin, in the 
Yellow Sea off the Gulf of ·Pohai, in the South China Sea, and 
in the waters of ·Viet-Nam and the Philippines as well as 
Indonesia. There are conflicting claims of sovereignty in 
some of these areas, such as the Spratleys and the East China 
Sea north of Taiwan, which have inhibited development even 
though much of the affected area is under lease. When those 
disputed claims are resolved, and admitting ·that in some cases 
this may take years, development will proceed and the 
benefits to the entire world will be immense. 
If, as I believe is the case, Japan's confidence in its 
partnership with the United States is based heavily on its 
perception of our role in East Asia as a whole, what the 
Japanese have seen over the past year could not have been 
entirely reassuring. The problem, I am convinced, is one of 
perception rather than of reality. I would ·argue, and have so 
argued in many conversations in Japan, that there has been no 
lessening of the importance this nation attaches to its ties 
with Japan and to its role in East Asia generally. But there 
is no doubt that we have at times given an impression of 
indirection and inconsistency. We have muddied the waters. 
This was probably an inevitable by-product of a transition in 
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the United States as sharp as any since World War II. I, of 
course, am of the view that that transition was a healthy phe-
nomenon, representing as it did a vitally necessary political 
renewal in this country. But it has had its disquieting side 
effects in our relations with Asia. In emphasizing change, we 
may have placed insufficient stress on the important ~lements 
of continuity in our policies. 
I believe our task is to reaffirm the major elements of a 
well defined and widely understood Asian policy, while making 
the adjustments necessary to insure consistency with chang'ing 
circumstances. Some of these adjustments are highly important, 
reflecting the determination of this Administration to construct 
a foreign policy fully in accord with American values and which 
will elicit the broadest possible popular support. At the same 
time, the basic thrust of our policy toward the region is and 
should remain unchanged -- we see ourselves, correctly, as a 
major participant in the affairs of East Asia. Japan is 
engaged in something more fundamental -- tailoring its foreign 
policy to its position as a major world power, defining its 
role vis-a-vis its principal communist neighbors, Southeast 
Asia, Europe, and the rest of the world. In so d6ing, · Japan 
continues to see its ties with the United States as the essen-
tial foundation upon which to build the structure of its 
worldwide diplomacy. 
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Japan's prospects for continued ·success, in an uncertain 
world, are good. The industry and talents of its people are 
limitless. But Japan faces serious problems as well, 
particularly in the economic area. Americans, and Japan's 
other trading partners, sometimes tend to overestimate -its 
strengths. We look at huge trade surpluses, astounding 
productivity, high growth rates, low levels of unemployment 
and we feel a mixture of awe, envy, frustration and hostility. 
For their part, the ~apanese tend to focus ·too ·sharply on 
their weaknesses. · Despite their phenomenal ·economic success 
of the last quarter century and their rank ·as the world's 
third largest economy, the Japanese think of themselves as a 
small, exceedingly vulnerable society, hostage far ·more than 
other advanced nations to forces beyond their control -- oil 
embargoes, recession, protectionism. The Japanese have thus 
been slow to recognize that their economic power imposes 
responsibilities, that other nations as well as they are 
vulnerable, that leadership rather than mere participation 
is called for. Perceptions, ours of Japan and Japan's of us, 
are out of phase, and perceptions as much as realities phape 
international relationships. That much was evident in looking 
back ov~r the past year. 
It is impo'rtant to recall that a year ago there were not 
one but two new governments managing the US-Japan relationship. 
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When Vice President Mondale arrived in Tokyo on the last day 
of January 1977 he was representing a government one week old 
to one that was all of one month old. While our transition 
was a bit more sweeping than theirs, the fact is there was new 
leadership in Tokyo as well as in Washington, and each 
administration was to some extent an unknown quantity to the 
other. There was no dearth of issues to address -- preemi-
nently Korea, nuclear nonproliferation policy, and economic 
questions -- and all were to one degree or another affected by 
the newness of the governments dealing with them on both sides 
of the ocean. 
The Japanese were disturbed when a withdrawal of ground 
troops from Korea emerged as a tenet of President Carter's 
foreign policy during the campaign, and when the Vice President 
reaffirmed it during his visit a week after the inauguration. 
The Japanese were bothered by the substance of the decision 
questioning whether withdrawal could take place without up-
setting stability on the peninsula and endangering regional 
security. They were perhaps even ~ore concerned by the abrupt 
manner in which,in their eyes, the decision appeared to have 
been taken. I happen to believe the decision was correct 
a wise and judicious measure which fundamentally is an exten-
sion of a policy of careful, gradual withdrawal of ground 
combat forces dating back to 1969. 
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The Japanese now understand that we ·have in mind a 
program of carefully phased withdrawal accompanied by 
measures to strengthen our remaining air forces and South 
Korean forces, and I believe they understand as well that 
this withdrawal does not portend any diminution of our commit-
ment to the security of the Republic of Korea. But all this 
was not clear at first. Perhaps we had not taken sufficient 
pains to make ourselves fully understood; and certainly press 
treatment of the issue, in this country and in Japan, was 
not always accurate and well reasoned. In any event, the 
perceived abruptness of our action for a time undermined 
Japanese confidence in the constancy of American policy toward 
the most crucial security issue in Asia. 
While the problem with Korean troop withdrawal from the 
Japanese perspective was its seeming precipitiousness, the 
Tokai Mura issue seemed to Japanese observers to reflect at 
the outset a too doctrinaire American approach to an exceedingly 
complicated issue. Japan, as you all know, is second to none 
in its abhorrence of nuclear weapons. But as a nation with 
few energy resources, it is also second to none in its desire 
to exploit the productive potential of peaceful nuclear power. 
It sees nuclear industry as the only realistic means for 
Japan to achieve a modicum of energy self- sufficiency. 
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Thus, Tokai Mura, Japan's pilot reprocessing plant, had become 
something of a symbol in Japan. 
When we announced in April, two months before Tokai Mura 
was to begin operation, that the United States would forego 
reprocessing and would encourage other nations to do the same, 
we had in mind a worldwide policy affecting ·all nations equally 
and to which all nations of good will could subscribe. Japan, 
and our European allies, saw it somewhat differently. For 
Japan in particular it caused serious ·problems. Not only would 
it have meant the abandonment of Tokai Mura and delays in 
Japan's nuclear industry development while alternatives to 
reprocessing were pursued, it also threatened perhaps irrepara-
ble damage to the national consensus which had been painstakingly 
built up in support of a nuclear industry. ·Moreover, it seemed 
potentially discriminatory -- while we could only encourage 
the Europeans to forego . reprocessing, we could, under the terms 
of· our bilateral nuclear agreement, forbid i~ in the case of 
Japan. 
But the problem was solved -- and I regard its resolution 
as perhaps the single most significant achievement in US-Japan 
relations in this past year. Ambassador Gerard Smith -- and 
the President, who took a personal interest in this issue --
deserve immense credit. Intensive negotiations addressing 
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both the political and technical aspects of the issue and 
extending from April through September resulted in an agreement 
meeting the essential needs of both sides -- Japan's for an 
early startup of Tokai Mura, ours for a solution consistent 
with a more effective nonproliferation regime. The agreement 
' 
reflected true compromise, and undoubtedly strengthened rather 
than weakened the prospects for broad international agreem.nt 
on an alternative to conventional reprocessing. The reproces-
sing issue is now being studied and debated in an international 
context, where it properly belongs. 
More complicated, more intractable, and less susceptible 
of tidy solution than Tokai Mura are ·the complex of economic 
issues confronted in our relations with Japan over the 
past year: 
Japan's huge worldwide current account surplus; 
Japan's massive surplus in our bilateral trade; 
Japan's reputation, much of it deserved, as a 
restricted market for imports; 
~- pressures in specific sectors of the American 
economy attributed to Japanese competition. 
The latter category -- what the economists call sectoral 
trade problems-- have seemed relatively more ·manageable. 
While extremely complicated, they at least are finite. 
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Two such problems were especially prominent during the past 
year -- color television imports and steel. A rapid increase . 
in the sales of Japanese color TV sets in · l976 caused deep 
concern within the US electronics industry and prompted calls 
for government action to redress the situation; Bob Strauss 
took this on as one of the first major problems with which he 
contended as the President's Special Trade Representative. 
He and the Japanese got together on several occasions, and 
through persistence, imagination and abundant good will -- the 
latter always being the indispensable ingredient -- an agree-
ment was reached which places reasonable limits on the export 
to this country of Japanese color TV sets. 
The second major sectoral problem was in the steel indus-
try. Earlier in the year, we reached an agreement which placed 
limits on specialty steel imports. The industry's broader 
problems were addressed more recently by the Solomon Committee 
recommendations establishing a formula intended to insure fair 
pricing in a variety of steel products. 
In respect to steel, the Japanese recognized months ago 
' 
that something needed to be done and indicated they would try 
to cooperate in whatever solution we might propose. They had 
a considerable wait while we figured out what to do. We were 
without a steel policy for too long a time. I am hopeful that 
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our solution -- the reference price system -- will work and 
I commend Under Secretary Solomon for the creativity and 
vision of his efforts. It should be noted, however, that 
this system is, of course, only a stopgap measure pending a 
more permanent solution in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
I think I also should point out an often overlooked aspect of 
the steel problem: that European producers, as much as Japan's 
-- and in recent months more than Japan's -- have also made 
life difficult for our industry. We ought not be quick in 
blaming other people for our problems -- but if we are allo-
cating blame at all, we should at least do it evenly. 
The larger aspects of these economic problems -- our 
limited access to Japan as a market and Japan's hugh global 
current account surplus have been addressed intermittently 
throughout the year. Our dialogue on these issues began with 
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the Vice President's visit last January, and continued at a 
high level with Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to Washington 
in March and the participation of both leaders in the London 
Economic Summit in May. They were a matter of almost daily 
contact at the expert level throughout the spring and summer. 
By the late summer, when it became apparent that projections 
made earlier in the year would not hold up, our efforts -- and 
Japan's --were stepped up. 
In September we and the J~panese began a process of 
consultation -- not confrontation -- as intensive and far 
reaching as any we have had with Japan; ·or perhaps with any 
other country, on any issue. Those consultations, including 
the visit here oi Minister Ushiba in December, concluded with 
a visit by Ambassador Strauss to Tokyo in mid-January. It is 
fitting that this round -- and it is only a round, we all 
recognize that -- ended with Bob Strauss's visit. More than 
any other individual on our side, it was Bob Strauss who 
worked with Minister Ushiba and his colleagues in the Japanese 
Government to produce a highly satisfactory outcome. Looking 
at it from my point of view, I would say that while we were . 
not always totally consistent in our approach, we certainly 
• 
did not lack persistence -- and the res~lts were good: 
--. Japan (our largest agricultural customer by !ar, with 
purchases approaching $4 billion a year) has agreed 
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to increase its imports of agricultural products 
from the United States, in the face of strong oppo-
sition from its own farming industry; 
-- Japan has indicated its intention to seek a domestic 
economic growth rate in 1978 of 7 percent, and has 
taken concrete measures to fulfill that goal1 
Japan has allowed a sharp appreciation of the yen, 
which should over time be reflected in its trade 
balance, even though this has endangered many domestic 
businesses; 
Japan has reaffirmed its commitment to the MTN, and 
in advance has lowered its tariffs on products impor-
tant to the United States, including cars and computers; 
Japan has indicated it will exercise restraint in 
its export policies and that it will in a variety of 
specific ways seek to open its own market to foreign 
products; 
-~ Japan has acknowledged that the eventual result of 
these measures should be a sharp reduction in its 
surplus or even equilibrium in its overall current 
account balance. 
The ultimate effect of these efforts by Japan will not be 
evident for some months. But what is evident now, and what 
American observers of these issues should appreciate, is th~t 
the steps Japan has decided to take entail genuine sacrifice, 
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painful adjustment in wide sectors of its economy, and 
significant political risk. They were not easy or empty 
concessions. Just as these economic problems impact directly 
on local communities and specific interest groups in the 
United States, creating strong pressures for favorable solutions 
which are reflected in and amplified by the Congress, so it is 
in Japan. Many sectors of the Japanese economy are in trouble; 
the Japanese Diet represents and defends the position of con-
stituents who feel themselves threatened by American "demands." 
Thus, in the context in which they were taken, these were bold 
measures by the Japanese Government. We, and our European 
colleagues, must give Japan full credit. ·· 
I am optimistic. I know that the steps we and the Japanese 
Government have agreed upon are genuine ~rtd not merely cosmetic 
in nature, and I am convinced they are going to show results. 
More important perhaps, I know the determination and the com-
mitment both governments bring to these issues; if solutions 
are possible -- and, of course, they are -- we are going to find 
them and apply them. 
A word of caution is in order, however. · No matter ho~ 
effective all of our efforts prove to be, they are not going 
to solve the world's economic problems. Even if all goes as 
planned in the us-Japan economic relationship, dysfunction .in 
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the US and world economies will ·remain. The ·problems are 
global and solutions must be global. The first major step 
toward a permanent global solution must be a restoration of 
general business confidence and a successful conclusion this 
summer to the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions in Geneva. Japan and we are committed to that goal. 
Nor can even a successful windup of the MTN insure an end 
to our problems. The single most important source of our trou-
bles is not being addressed in Geneva. I refer to our own 
massive oil bill. The United States is the world's greatest 
user, greatest waster and greatest importer of oil. So long 
as we spend $45 billion per year ·-- or 30 ·percent of our total 
import bill -- buying foreign oil, our economy and the world 
..t-....<kl ~ fL..~~. 
economy will be out of kilter.v Only we are to blame and only 
we can find a solution. We need an energy program. The 
President has proposed one; it is time for the Congress to act 
on it. 
When one considers the problems we have faced ~- none 
of them of our making, even though I have suggested we may have 
made one or two of them temporarily worse -- we have go~ten 
through the past year in relatively good shape. Major problems 
either are resolved or under control. An atmosphere of trust 
-··-----·-
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and confidence has been restored. Personal relationships at 
all levels are cordial. Thus, the structure for problem 
solving is intact and functioning. For years, people within 
the government have spoken of the impressive capacity of the 
US-Japan relationship to manage difficult issues, and have 
suggested that this was in fact the truest measure of the 
strength of the relationship. If that is true, I would say 
1977 proved that our ties are in .pretty good · shape. We didn't 
get the best of every one of our problems, but at least we 
didn't let ·those problems get the best of us. So long as we 
emphasize candor and cooperation, steering clear of confronta-
tion, we will be all right in the future as well. I think the 
outlook is good. 
I want to leave you with one other thought. For years I 
have contended that Americans ought to look west -- all the 
way to the Far East-- that we have never ·made adequate efforts 
to understand Asia, and that without understanding Asia we are 
bound to make some serious mistakes in Asia. · Our history 
unfortunately demonstrates this is so. h~en we do pay attention 
to the region it often is for the wrong reason, and it often is 
superficial. Our own ethnic and cultural heritage is predom-
inantly European and, important though our ties with other 
regions are, we continue to have a European bias when we as a 
nation view the world. This is a perception we must work to 
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change. Asia must loom large in our national consciousness: 
Our trade with East Asia reached almost $60 billion 
in 1977. 
Japan is our largest overseas trading partner; our 
two-way trade came to nearly $29 billion last year. 
Our direct capital investment in East Asia now exceeds 
$15 billion, and it is growing rapidly. 
Japan is a vital, democratic society in a world 
widely hostile to democratic values; ours is truly 
an alliance of ideals. 
Our role in East Asia -- political, economic and 
strategic -- is an essential element in the maintenance 
of peace, stability and progress in that region and 
serves American interests no less vital than those 
at stake in Europe. 
Yet far too few Americans take time to really attempt 
to understand Japan or Asia. So long as this is so, our 
perceptions as a nation will be faulty, our judgments askewed. 
This and other similar groups across the country have as 
their goal increased understanding at all levels between 
this country and the nations of Asia. The results of 
those efforts won't show in next year's trade balance, 
but they may ultimately result in a more balanced American 
appreciation of where our true interests lie. 
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